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Abstract: This paper examines the impact of minimum wage legislation in developing countries where
coverage is incomplete.  Using a rich data set from Ghana, it estimates the extent to which a binding
minimum wage alters employment in both the formal and informal sectors of the labor market.  The data
reveal that Ghana’s minimum wage policies during the 1970s and 1980s led to a reduction of formal sector
jobs and an increase in informal sector jobs.  In addition, there is some evidence to suggest that a large
proportion of the displaced workers from the formal sector ended up working in the informal sector.ContentsThe definition of unemployment used for most official statistics defines a worker as unemployed if he/she
1
is currently not employed and has searched for work in the last month.
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I. Introduction
Most developing countries have minimum wage laws which, in principle, guarantee low-skilled
workers a wage high enough to cover their basis needs.  Such laws are popular with public policy
makers because they are believed to raise the incomes of the working poor.  There is, of course,
a downside to minimum wage legislation.  When the minimum exceeds the equilibrium wage, jobs
are rationed and there is always a risk that unemployment could rise.  Assessing the total impact
of minimum wage legislation, however, is not an easy task.  While it is clear that a binding
minimum will lower the level of employment,  it is not so clear what impact it will have on the
level of unemployment.  By definition, unemployment rises when there is an increase in the
number of unemployed workers who are seeking jobs .  Such a situation may or may not arise as
1
a result of minimum wage legislation.
So, is the introduction of a minimum wage a good means for raising the incomes of the
working poor?  Despite its popularity, there are several reasons to believe that minimum wages
may not be an effective policy instrument for reducing poverty.  First, many workers are not
covered by minimum wage legislation, particularly in developing countries.  In Ghana and several
other African countries, for example, employers have no legal obligation to pay apprentices and
casual workers the minimum wage.  In addition, it is common practice for part-time workers,
domestic servants, the self-employed and child laborers to be excluded from coverage.  Not
surprisingly, these groups of workers are often among the lowest paid in the workforce. 
Incomplete coverage, however, is not simply a result of poorly written legislation.  A
significant proportion of workers in low-income countries are not covered by minimum wage laws
for the simple reason that they work outside the wage sector.  In Sub-Saharan Africa, for
example, 68 percent of the labor force engage in agricultural activities and many of these laborers
do not earn a wage but, instead, survive by selling or consuming their own farm output (World
Bank, 1996).  Moreover, a growing proportion of urban workers earn their living by working at
one (or more) informal sector activities.  Usually informal sector workers do not earn a wage but,
even if they do, it is likely to fall below the minimum.  A recent survey of the informal sector in
Africa, for example, revealed that over 80 percent of the firms in Swaziland and nearly 98 percent
of the firms in Niger do not comply with minimum wage legislation (Squire and Suthiwart-
Narueput, 1995).  Ironically, it is workers in these firms whose incomes are most likely to fall
below the poverty line. 
Second, even in countries where a large proportion of the workforce is engaged in wage
employment,  there is no guarantee that the minimum wage will have any “bite” if the level of firm
compliance is low.   It is a well-recognized fact that firms are likely to evade minimum wage
legislation when either the probability of detection is low or the costs of compliance are high.  In
many developing countries minimum wage laws have little impact because of  lax enforcement
which increases firms’ incentive to cheat.  Lax enforcement usually occurs as a result of poor
administration and the inability of regulators to carry out adequate inspection of firms.  Similarly,
firms have an incentive to cheat when the distortionary costs of the minimum wage are high.  Such
a situation arises when the minimum wage is above the market equilibrium (i.e., it is binding) and
the relevant elasticities of supply and demand are high enough to make a substantial impact on
firm efficiency (Squire and Suthiwart-Narueput, 1995).  
Third, even in countries where coverage and compliance is high, minimum wage legislation
may have the undesired effect of reducing the demand for low-skilled workers.  This effect occurs2
because firms prefer to hire (or maintain in employment) those workers whose wages have risen
by the smallest proportion as a result of the minimum.  As explained by Welch (1974, p.292), 
If all those who would earn less than the minimum are substitutes, then employers
will substitute in favor of those workers whose relative costs have increased least
and these (indirect) effects may dominate.  This is the presumption underlying the
“ripple effect” which holds that for workers above the minimum labor demand
increases and the effect declines with the distance from the minimum.  For
workers who would have been below the minimum the converse holds and
adverse employment effects increase with the distance from the minimum.  
Consequently, a binding minimum wage may actually reduce the demand for those workers whom
it intends to benefit.
In developing countries this “ripple effect” may have an even larger impact that it does in
developed countries where workers are protected (at least to some extent) from adverse demand
shocks by mechanisms like unemployment insurance.  Without such benefits workers who are
displaced have only two choices: (1) go to work in the “uncovered” sector or (2) become
unemployed and search for work in the “covered” sector.  Since most unskilled workers in
developing countries have little savings on which to fall back during unemployment spells, it is
unlikely that poor workers who lose their job will remain unemployed for any substantial length
of time.  A more likely scenario is that the displaced workers will take up some form of informal
sector employment.  Theory predicts that informal sector wages will fall when the supply of labor
to the informal sector rises and there is no matching rise in demand.
Few studies examine the impact of minimum wage legislation on employment in both the
“covered” and “uncovered” sectors.  This paper partially fills this void by investigating the extent
to which minimum wage legislation in Ghana during the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s affected
employment opportunities in its formal and informal sectors.  To assess the impact of Ghanian
minimum wage legislation, the study employs two sets of data: one time series and one set of
cross-sectional data.  These data sets are unusual in several ways.  The time-series data include
aggregate employment figures which are classified according to whether the workers are
employed in the formal or informal sector.  In addition, the cross-sectional data contain firm-level
employment figures which cover the period both immediately before and after the implementation
of a new minimum wage law.   These data sets are somewhat unusual in that they include
employment data on firms which operate in both the formal and informal sectors.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents a simple model of
the impact of minimum wage legislation in labor markets with complete and incomplete coverage.
Section III discusses the pattern of minimum wages that were dominant in Africa during the
1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s.  Section IV plots the wage distributions of workers in the formal
and informal sectors in order to assess the extent of compliance among Ghanaian manufacturing
firms.  This section also presents histograms for several types of workers which highlights the lack
of coverage among certain categories of workers.  Section V reports the main results from the
time-series and cross-sectional analysis.  Finally, Section VI concludes the chapter.
II. Employment Effects in Labor Markets with Complete and Incomplete Coverage
The purpose of this section is to review the theoretical framework used for assessing the impact
of minimum wage legislation.  Although numerous studies in the past have examined the











See Welch (1974), Mincer (1976), Gramlich (1976), and Jones (1987) for a theoretical discussion of the
2
effects of minimum wage legislation under incomplete coverage.  None of these papers, however,  apply the
analysis to a development context.
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markets.   This omission is somewhat surprising, given the large proportion of workers in low-
2
income countries who are engaged in informal sector employment and other non-wage activities.
To assess the full impact of minimum wage legislation in developing countries, it is therefore
necessary to outline the effects of the minimum in both the “covered” and “uncovered” sectors.
A. Complete Coverage
1) Standard Competitive Model    
The simple textbook model is easily illustrated by the Marshallian cross in Figure 1.  This model
assumes a competitive labor market with homogeneous workers who earn   before the
minimum wage is set and  after the minimum wage is set.  In this labor market all workers have
the same skills and effort levels (i.e., they are perfect substitutes), all employers pay the minimum
wage (i.e., coverage is complete), and employment is determined simply by supply and demand.
Initially the equilibrium level of employment is  at   but the level falls to  after the minimum
wage is implemented;   represents the demand for labor at  . The proportional decline in
employment  is equal to the proportional rise in the wage   multiplied
by the elasticity of demand.
It is clear from Figure 1 that an excess supply of labor  arises once the minimum
wage is introduced.  This excess supply, however, should not be interpreted as the rise in
unemployment which occurs as a result of the legislated minimum.  Typically, the official measure
of unemployment is the number of workers who are currently not in paid employment but are
seeking work.  Unless all workers who make up the excess supply of labor actually believe that
they have a good chance of getting a job, some workers will choose not to engage in any type of
job search.  This means that the number of unemployed will be some fraction less than the number
of workers comprising  .  The fraction who are unemployed can only be determined by
probabilistic models which take into account various factors which determine a worker’s chance
of obtaining employment.  While such a model is beyond the realm of this chapter, the point I wish
to emphasize is that the simple textbook model can make few inferences about the impact of a
minimum on the unemployment rate.  What the model does tell us is that the level of employment
will decline as a result of the introduction of a minimum above the equilibrium wage; it provides
no information about how the number of unemployed will be affected.
2) Monopsony Model    
Contrary to the competitive model which predicts that a minimum wage will lower the level of
employment, the monopsony model predicts the opposite effect.  According to Stigler’s (1946)
textbook case, the marginal cost of labor to firms with monopsony power always exceeds the
supply price of labor (Figure 2). Monopsonists are assumed to minimize costs by hiring workers
up to the point at which the marginal cost of labor is equal to their demand for labor.  This point
occurs at   in Figure 2.  Once a minimum wage is introduced, the monopsonist becomes a price-
taker up to the competitive wage rate,  .  Consequently, a minimum wage which is set at 
leads to an increase in employment from   to  .  If the minimum wage were set at a level









Until recently, the monopsonist case has been viewed largely as an analytical curiosity with
little application to the real world.  In the last few years, however, a number of empirical studies
have found evidence that a higher minimum wage is associated with a rise in employment.  Card
and Krueger (1994), for example, examine the level of employment in fast-food restaurants before
and after a rise in the minimum wage in New Jersey.  They compare employment growth in New
Jersey restaurants with the employment growth in similar fast-food restaurants in Pennsylvania
(a state with similar demand conditions where the minimum wage was held constant).  The
authors find that employment in New Jersey rose relative to that in Pennsylvania, despite the fact
that New Jersey had entered a recession after the introduction of the minimum wage.  Moreover,
employment in New Jersey expanded in low-wage whereas it contracted in high-wage
restaurants—a result contrary to the assumed “ripple effect”.  Other studies have also found
evidence that minimum wages have little or no impact on employment (Card, 1992; Card and
Krueger, 1994; Machin and Manning, 1994; and Manning, 1996). Such results have been
interpreted in many economic circles as empirical evidence in support of the monopsonist case.
B. Incomplete Coverage
1) Standard Competitive Model    
As discussed above, the assumption that all workers in developing countries are covered by
minimum wage legislation is clearly unrealistic.  Throughout the developing world a significant
proportion of the workforce earn their living through non-wage activities like self-employment,
informal sector work, and domestic services.  Thus, it is more appropriate to apply a model in
which coverage is incomplete when examining the effects of labor market interventions in low-
income countries.  The earliest model to include a sector in which workers were not covered by
the minimum wage was put forward by Welch (1974).  The basic intuition behind the Welch
model is straight forward and can easily be applied to a development context.  
Let’s assume initially that there is perfect mobility across sectors and all workers are
identical and paid the same wage, .  Since there is no wage differential across sectors, workers
are indifferent between informal and formal sector work.  Consequently, the level of employment
is the same in the two sectors because there is an equal demand for labor in both sectors (Figure
3).  By imposing a minimum above the equilibrium wage rate, jobs in the formal sector are
rationed (Figure 4).  As a result of the higher minimum,   some workers who would like to
work at the minimum are unable to find jobs.  There is now an excess of labor  comprised
of workers who would like to be employed in the formal sector.  If all of these workers go to
work in the informal sector, employment in the informal sector will rise to   and wages will
fall from   to  .  Thus the introduction of a minimum has led to a wage differential of
 and a reduction of formal sector employment by the amount  .
The impact of a minimum wage is somewhat different when there is no labor mobility
between sectors (Figure 5).  Once again, the introduction of a minimum raises the wage in the
formal sector from   to  and creates an excess supply of labor   to the formal sector.
Because labor supply is completely inelastic, no workers shift into informal sector employment
and unemployment  emerges among formal sector workers.  There are many reasons why
labor supply may be inelastic with a wage fixed above the market-clearing rate.  For example,
trade union power, efficiency wages, and rent-sharing may all lead to situations in which it is in
the employer’s interest to maintain its wages above the equilibrium rate.  The same is not true in
the informal sector where wages are assumed to be very elastic.  Moreover, the supply of informal







C++ programmers prefer to work in firms that own C++ software because they will be paid a wage
3
premium for their programming skills.  If they move to a firm which uses another software, their skills will not
be as well matched.  Consequently, the firms that own C++ software can pay their programmers less than their
marginal product as long as they pay them more than they could earn elsewhere.
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equals  .  Consequently, minimum wage legislation has little impact on workers in the
informal sector.  Unlike the case of perfect labor mobility, the entire brunt of the legislation falls
on the shoulders of workers in the formal sector who experience a rise in unemployment.
 2) Monopsony Model    
The monopsony model in the case of a dualistic market is somewhat complicated.  To make the
analysis easy, let’s assume that only firms in the “covered” sector can possess monopsony power.
This assumption may seem unrealistic but it is easy to imagine at least one situation in which
employers in the “covered” sector could have monopsony power while employers in the
“uncovered” sector remain competitive.  Such a situation might arise if workers have invested in
skills that are not easily transferred across firms.  Imagine, for example, that a small proportion
of workers in some developing country have trained to be computer programmers in C++ because
the salary of such programmers is five times the average salary.  These workers face one problem:
only a handful of large companies employ C++ programmers and all of these firms are located in
the capital city.  If there is no shortage of such programmers, it is conceivable that firms who
demand C++ programmers may possess some monopsony power.  This is because all workers
who are proficient in C++ prefer to work in firms that own C++ software rather than in any other
type of firm .  The fact that these workers are not paid their marginal product does not matter:
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they are still earning more than they could in any other type of firm.  Of course, this situation is
only realistic when there is no shortage of C++ programmers.  If there were a shortage, any firm
could poach its rivals’ programmers by simply offering a higher wage.
When some firms have monopsony power, the introduction of a minimum wage will raise
the level of employment in the non-competitive sector (Figure 6).  Before the minimum wage,
firms with monopsony power hire workers up to the point at which the marginal cost of labor
equals the demand for labor.  This results in   workers employed in the formal sector and
 workers employed in the formal sector.  Workers in the formal sector prefer their work to
employment in the informal sector because their wage,  , is substantially higher than the wage
of workers in the informal sector,  .  Any minimum wage which lies above  and is less than
or equal to  will have the desired effect of increasing formal sector employment.  For example,
If the minimum is set at  , formal sector employment will expand to  .
III. Three Decades of Minimum Wage Policies in Africa
It is often claimed that African governments acted irresponsibly with respect to minimum wage
legislation before the era of structural adjustment.  The evidence, however, does not support such
a claim.  Table 1 lists the value of the real minimum wage in a wide range of African countries.
The broad pattern which emerges is that minimum wages in Africa generally rose during the first
half of the 1970s and then fell during the next decade and a half.  In some cases, the erosion of
the minimum during the late 1970s was massive. In Zaire, for example, the real value of the
minimum fell by almost 600 percent between 1975 and 1980.  The Ghanaian minimum wage
experienced a similar decline; its real value fell by over 500 percent over the same period.  
In other countries the value of the minimum eroded continuously from the mid-1970s
through to 1990.  In the Cote d’Ivoire, for example, the real value of the minimum declined forGhana has a de facto two-tiered minimum wage system.  There is an official minimum wage which is
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agreed upon during negotiations between the government, the Trade Union Congress, and the Ghana Employers’
Association.  There is, however, another minimum which is paid to public sector workers.
The government’s role with respect to minimum wage legislation was by no means passive between 1983
5
and 1990.  On six separate occasions it passed minimum wage increases. 
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fifteen years, falling from 114 in 1975 to 79 in 1990.  Similar declines were experienced by
Gabon, Kenya, Senegal, and Togo.  Liberal wage policies were also followed by the governments
in Benin and the Congo over the period 1975 to 1985.  The value of the minimum in these
countries declined by 52 percent and 61 percent, respectively.  Other African countries—
Botswana, Burkino Faso, Malawi, Niger, and Tunisia— had a more mixed pattern of minimum
wage legislation.  In these countries the value of the minimum fluctuated somewhat over the
period 1975 to 1990, declining in some periods while rising in others.  Only in Morocco did the
value of the minimum rise continuously from 1975 onwards.
As was the case in many African countries the real value of the minimum wage in Ghana
rose to record levels during the first half of the 1970s and then fell from 1975 to 1990.  Between
1970 and 1975 the value of the minimum increased by more than 40 percent for private sector
workers and by more than 80 percent for public sector workers .   After 1975 the government’s
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attitude toward the minimum  changed considerably in response to a number of budgetary and
political crises.  Faced with a growing debt problem, the government allowed the real value of the
minimum to be eroded by almost a decade of rising inflation.  By 1985 the value of the minimum
had fallen to less than a third of its value in 1975 (see Figure 7).  Public sector wages also fell
during the period 1975 to 1980, although the government intervened after 1980 to prevent further
erosion (see Figure 8).  Public sector wages rose in real terms between 1980 and 1981, then fell
the next year, and then rose in value during every successive year from 1983 until 1988.  The
same wage protection, however, was not granted to private sector workers.  The private sector
minimum wage fell in value during the period 1981 to 1984, then rose between 1984 and 1985,
and then fell again during each year until 1988.  Indeed, in 1988 the value of the minimum was
five times less than it had been in 1970.
Not all of the decline, however, was a direct by-product of the government’s wage policy .
5
Average wages in Ghana also fell throughout the period 1975 to 1983 (see Figure 9).  This
decline was due largely to the collapse of the economy which was brought on by a succession of
political crises.  Between 1975 and 1983 both average wages and the minimum fell at much the
same rate.  The same is not true of the period 1983 to 1988.  During these years average wages
rose at a much faster rate than the minimum.  Between 1983 and 1984, for example, the ratio of
the minimum wage to the average manufacturing wage fell from 0.50 to 0.26.  By 1989 the value
of the minimum wage just 15 percent of the value of the average manufacturing wage.  Clearly
the low level of the minimum relative to average manufacturing wages meant that it had little
effective “bite” since the average Ghanaian industrial worker was paid almost two-thirds more.
The government’s position on minimum wage legislation changed again during the early
1990s.  In August 1991 the Government of Ghana declared a new daily minimum wage which
raised the old minimum in real terms by over 25 percent.  The aim of this legislation, which was
supported by both the trade union movement and the Ghana Employers’ Association, was to
increase the purchasing power of low-income workers.  Such legislation was unusual both in the
size of its mandated increase (over 100 percent in nominal terms) and the timing of its passage.
Throughout the 1980s the real value of the minimum had fallen steadily due to higher-than-It should be noted that the earnings data were collected before the second large increase in the minimum
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which occurred at the end of 1992.
The real value of the minimum wage in 1990 prices is 14,913 cedis. 
7
The informal sector is defined as all firms that use only hand tools.
8
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expected inflation which quickly eroded the government’s modest, nominal increases.   By
contrast, the 1991 law came into effect during a period of falling inflation which meant that its
“bite” was expected to be large.
IV. Minimum Wages and the Wage Distribution in Ghana
One way of assessing whether the minimum wage is actually enforced is to plot the earnings of
individuals as a histogram.  The position and shape of the histogram provide information on the
extent of compliance.  If there were no government intervention in the labor market, one would
expect the wage distribution to be relatively smooth, reflecting the underlying distribution of skills
among workers.  On the other hand, if employers actually enforce the minimum, there will be
some workers who would have earned less than the minimum but are no longer employed.  The
fact that some workers have lost their job should create a spike in the wage distribution which is
relatively close to the legally imposed minimum.  If there is no spike or if the spike lies
significantly to the right or the left or the minimum, the data indicate that the minimum has little
effective “bite”.
            The data used to plot the histograms in this section are taken from a 1992 survey of
Ghanaian manufacturing workers which was completed as part of the World Bank’s ‘Regional
Program on Enterprise Development’ (RPED).  These data were collected over the period July
to September 1992 and therefore reflect the earnings of workers approximately one year after the
initial increase in the minimum wage.  It is expected that any firm that wanted to comply with the
new legislation would have adjusted its workers’ wages by this date .  Although it would have
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been preferable to have data on 1991 earnings, the 1992 data provide a good picture of both the
shape of the Ghanaian wage distribution and the number of workers who earn less than the
minimum wage .   
7
Several histograms are presented for different groups of workers.  The wage distribution
of all full-time employees (i.e., employees who work 40+ hours per week) is depicted in Figure
10.  In this diagram there is a definite clustering of wages near the minimum which suggests that
a large proportion of Ghanaian manufacturing firms do comply with the labor legislation.  There
is also spike in the wage distribution near the minimum, indicating that some workers have
probably lost their job as a result of the minimum.  The pattern of wages in Figure 10 clearly
contrast with those plotted in Figure 11 which depicts the wages of workers in the informal
sector .  As expected, the majority of workers in the informal sector earn a wage that is less than
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the minimum.  But there is also a spike near the minimum which indicates that some firms in the
informal sector comply with the labor legislation.  Overall, the shape of the two histograms
suggests that the level of firm compliance is relatively high in Ghana, except in the informal sector
where the majority of workers earn less than the minimum.
The next few histograms plot the wages of different categories of workers.  Figures 12
and 13 present the wage distribution of production and non-production workers, respectively.
In Figure 12 there is a spike in the distribution near the value of the minimum which is consistent
with the prediction that some production workers have lost their job as a result of the laborln(w)t ’ ’ a% %bln(minw)t% %cXt% %dt% %g g
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High-skilled workers are those who have completed 9 years or more of education whereas low-skilled
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workers are those who have completed less than 9 years of education.
The most obvious problem associated with aggregate data is the inability to control for many factors which
10
affect wages (e.g., individual skills, firm characteristics, etc.).  By excluding such variables, the estimates may be




market intervention.  From the shape of the distribution, however, it appears that the majority of
production workers are paid a wage which either equals or exceeds the minimum wage.  The same
is not true for non-production workers.  It can be seen from Figure 13 that most non-production
workers are paid a wage far in excess of the minimum.  Indeed, the spike in the wage distribution
of non-production workers is much to the right of the minimum, indicating that the minimum is
not at all binding.  
A similar pattern occurs in the wage distribution of union workers which is depicted in
Figure 14.  Most union workers are paid a wage that exceeds the minimum, although a small spike
does occur near the value of the minimum which suggests that the minimum is binding in some
union firms.  Quite surprisingly, the minimum is also binding for non-union workers as seen in
Figure 15.  Only about half of all non-union workers appear to be paid a wage which equals or
exceeds the minimum.  The last two histograms plot the wages of workers who are high-skilled
or low-skilled .  Figure 16 plots the wage distribution of high-skilled workers and Figure 17 plots
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the wage distribution of low skilled workers.  Notice that in Figure 16 a spike appears near the
minimum, even though a large proportion of high-skilled workers earn more than the minimum.
By contrast, there is no spike near the minimum in Figure 17; the spike occurs far to the left of
the minimum for low-skilled workers.  Thus, high-skilled workers tend to earn at least the
minimum whereas low-skilled workers tend to earn less than the minimum. 
V. Assessing the Impact of the Minimum Wage on Ghanaian Employment
Until recently, most of the literature on minimum wages has been dominated by time-series
analysis  (see Brown, Gilroy, and Kohen (1982) and Hammermesh (1993) for a survey of these
studies). Typically, the results from such studies provide strong evidence that a binding minimum
will have a large, negative impact on employment, particularly teenage employment.  Although
the shortcomings associated with the use of such aggregate data are well-known (see
Hammermesh, 1993), it is still useful to estimate a time-series relationship in order to compare
the Ghanaian results to those estimated for other countries .  Specifically, I estimate the following
10
equations:
where   is the average manufacturing wage,  is the size of the labor force divided by
the country’s population,   is the legally imposed minimum wage,   is the
minimum wage deflated by the average manufacturing wage,  is a time trend, and   is set of
macro variables which control for business cycle fluctuations, terms of trade shocks, and weather




See Summers and Heston (1991) for a description of the these data.
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Durban-Watson statistics were calculated for all regressions in order to test for autocorrelation.  In
12
regressions where the Durban-Watson statistic was either above the appropriate critical value or in the inconclusive
region, the Prais-Winston (1954) estimator was used to correct for any possible serial autocorrelation. 
According to the African Employment Report (1990), over 80 percent of Ghanaian workers in wage
13
employment during the 1980s were public sector employees.
9
is the nominal gross national product,    is the GDP price deflator,    is the export price
of cocoa,   is the domestic price of fertilizer, and  is a dummy variable indicating
whether the government has begun its program of structural adjustment.  Large fluctuations in
any of these variables (except the dummy policy variable) can affect both wages and employment.
The data used for the time-series analysis are based on several sources.  The data on
average manufacturing wages were taken from numerous editions of the Yearbook of Labour
Statistics which is published by the International Labour Office (ILO).  The GDP figures, the price
deflator, and the cocoa export prices were taken from the 1996 edition of the International
Financial Statistics which is compiled by the International Monetary Fund.  The figures on
informal sector employment and female employment were derived from statistics reported in the
African Employment Report (1990), an occasional report that is published by the ILO.  The
population figures were down loaded from the on-line data base of the Penn World Tables 5.6 .
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Lastly, the labor force figures and the fertilizer prices were collected from World Bank’s on-line
data base of Social Indicators of Development (1995).  
One last variable needs some further explanation.  The dummy variable   indicates
whether the government had begun its structural adjustment program.  In 1983 the Ghanaian
government launched its “Economic Recovery Program” (ERP), an IMF-led program which set
into motion a wide range of stabilisation and liberalisation policies that were implemented during
the next decade.  To coincide with the years of structural adjustment, the dummy variable
takes a value of one for the years 1983 to 1991, inclusive.  The structural adjustment policies
included, inter alia, trade liberalization, foreign exchange liberalization, and a large retrenchment
of public sector employees.
Table 3 presents the results from estimating equations (1) and (2) .  If the labor market
12
in Ghana were fairly competitive during the 1970s and 1980s, it would be expected that the
minimum would have a positive impact on wages and a negative impact on employment.  The
aggregate data provide some evidence to support this prediction.  Notice in column (2) that the
minimum wage effect is positive and significant at the 1 percent level.  By contrast, the minimum
wage effect reported in column (1) is negative and insignificant.  The difference between the
specifications in these two columns is that the private sector minimum is used in column (1)
whereas the public sector minimum is used in column (2).  Thus the results suggest that the public
sector minimum had a much larger impact on wages than the private sector minimum.  This is not
surprising, given that most Ghanaians who work in the wage sector are employed by the
government .
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The results from estimating equation (2) provide fairly strong evidence that the minimum
wage in Ghana had a negative impact on employment.  The elasticity of employment to the private
sector and public sector minimum is 0.12 (column 3) and 0.17, respectively.  The elasticities
reported in columns (3) and (4) imply that Ghana experienced significant job losses during the








in size, they are similar in magnitude to the elasticities estimated for Puerto Rico (Castillo-
Freeman and Freeman, 1992) and for Colombia (Bell, 1995).  Moreover, they are considerably
larger than those estimated for Indonesia (Rama, 1996).
As discussed earlier, one effect which is not captured by conventional models is the impact
which the minimum has on informal sector employment and wages.  One would expect that a
large proportion of the workers in poor countries who are displaced by minimum wage legislation
will end up working in the informal sector.  If demand conditions in the labor market do not
change, the influx of workers to the informal sector will reduce wages in the “uncovered” sector.
To explore the effect of the minimum on informal sector employment, the dependent variable in
equation (2) is replaced by   where   is the number of workers in the informal
sector and   is the size of the total labor force.  Columns (1) and (2) of Table 4 report the
results from estimating this equation.  As expected, the minimum has a positive effect on informal
sector employment, although the coefficient on  is only significant when the public
sector minimum is used in the estimation.  The implied elasticities suggests that a large proportion
of the public sector workers displaced by the minimum wage shifted into informal sector
employment.  This can be inferred by comparing the minimum wage effect in column (4) of Table
3 with the minimum wage effect in column (2) of Table 4.  Notice that the employment elasticities
in the two tables have opposite signs but are very close in size.
Another possible effect of the minimum is a decline in female employment.  In many
developing countries women face considerable discrimination in the labor market.  It is easy to
imagine a situation arising in which employers lay off women before men when labor costs rise
as a result of an increase in the minimum wage.  In this paper, I examine the extent to which the
minimum wage affected female employment by replacing the dependent variable in equation (2)
with   where   is the number of female workers.  The results from estimating this
equation are reported in columns (3) and (4) of Table 4.  Surprisingly, the minimum wage had no
significant effect on female employment.  Moreover, the coefficient on  is positive,
suggesting that minimum wage legislation had a favorable impact on female employment.  It is
possible, for example, that more women entered the labor force in response to a fall in formal
sector employment which is largely dominated by men.
   Cross-sectional analyses based on establishment data provide a potentially stronger test
of how the minimum wage affected employment in Ghana.  The data used in the following analysis
are from a panel survey of 200 manufacturing firms organized under the World Bank’s ‘Regional
Program for Enterprise Development’ (RPED).   For the purposes of this study, only data from
the first two waves of the survey are used.  These surveys were conducted during the summers
of 1992 and 1993 but the data refer to the previous year.  Consequently, the first wave data
correspond to the period immediately before the introduction of the August 1991 minimum and
the second wave data correspond to the period immediately after its introduction.  Table 5
provides a list of the definitions and descriptive statistics of the variables used in the cross-
sectional analysis.
This study adopts the same methodology used by Card and Krueger (1994) to estimate
the impact of the minimum wage on employment.  The following two equations are estimated


















where  is the change in employment from wave 1 to wave 2 at firm  ,   is a vector of firm
characteristics, and  is a normally distributed error term.  Variables are included to control for
differences across firms in their capital-labor intensity, region, industry, unionization, minimum
wage compliance, and sector (i.e., informal versus formal).  
Two measures are used to assess the impact of the minimum on employment at firm  .
The first measure,  , is defined simply as the real minimum wage deflated by the unskilled
wage at firm  .  The second measure,   is defined as follows:
=  0 if the wages of production workers in firm  exceeded the minimum in 
wave 1 (i.e.,  )
=  for all other firms.
In other words,   represents the proportional increase in wages at firm necessary to raise
production workers’ wages to the minimum.  It is expected that small values of   will be
associated with small employment changes.  Therefore,   will be negatively associated with
employment if the minimum has adverse employment effects.
The results of estimating equations (3) and (4) are reported in Table 6.  Both minimum
wage measures have a negative impact on firm employment.  Given the average size of a firm in
the sample ( approximately 50 workers), the estimate in column (1) implies an employment
elasticity of about -6.0%.  This minimum wage effect is similar in magnitude to that experienced
by Puerto Rico (Castillo-Freeman and Freeman, 1992), Colombia (Bell, 1995), and teenagers in
the United States (Hammermesh, 1993).  A negative minimum wage effect is also found when
 replaces   in the estimated model.  The mean value of   among Ghanaian firms
in the RPED sample is 0.92.  Thus the estimate in column (2) suggests a fall of about 2.5
additional workers in firms which complied with the minimum wage legislation relative to those
that evaded the law.
In column (3) a somewhat stronger test of the minimum wage effect is provided by adding
a set of variables to the model which controls for regional effects, capital intensity, and the
dualistic nature of the labor market.  When these variables are included, the minimum wage effect
captured by   barely changes: the implied employment elasticity is still about -6.0%.  There
is, however, a huge difference in the coefficient on  .  The minimum wage effect captured
by   in column (4) is both positive and significant, although quite small in size.  The estimate
in column (4) suggests an increase of about 0.25 workers in firms that complied with the
legislation as compared to those which evaded the minimum.  Since most firms that pay wages
in excess of the minimum are large firms, this result provides some evidence in support of the
monopsony case among large firms.  This result is not too surprising, given the evidence
presented in Jones (1997) that some firms in Ghana behave like monopsonists by paying workers
less than their marginal product.  Moreover, a similar effect has been found in Indonesia (Rama,
1996) where the employment in large firms appears to have risen during the early 1990s in
response to a higher minimum wage.12
VI. Summary
One aspect of the minimum wage literature that has been largely neglected in previous empirical
studies is the effects of incomplete coverage on wages and employment.  This neglect is
particularly surprising within a development context, given the large proportion of workers who
are not employed in the formal sector.  Moreover, the assumption of complete coverage may
produce misleading results because models which assume complete coverage overlook how
minimum wage laws affect workers in the informal sector.
In this paper, I discuss the employment effects of minimum wage legislation in labor
markets with both complete and incomplete coverage, highlighting the possible problems such
laws present in poor countries where displaced workers do not have sufficient savings to “hold
out” for formal sector employment.  It is shown that minimum wage laws can lead to a rise in
informal sector employment and a fall in informal sector wages.  Several models are estimated
which capture the  minimum wage effects on workers in both the “covered” and the “uncovered”
sectors.  These models are estimated using two unique data sets from Ghana: one set of aggregate
data and one set of establishment data.  The aggregate data are somewhat unusual in that they
contain employment figures on the  number of workers who were employed in the formal and
informal sectors over the period 1970 to 1991.  Likewise, the establishment data also contain
employment information on workers in both the “covered” and “uncovered” sectors.  Since the
establishment data were collected both before and immediately after the implementation of the
new legislation, they are ideal for measuring the change in employment associated with the rise
in the minimum.
Several interesting results arise from the time-series and cross-sectional analysis.  As
predicted by standard theory, the minimum wage has significant, negative effects on formal sector
employment.  This result holds for both the aggregate and the establishment data.  It is revealed
that Ghanaian employment fell significantly in response to the government’s minimum wage
policies during the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s.  Specifically, the 1991 minimum wage was
associated with a 5 to 6 percent drop in total manufacturing employment.  The impact of the
minimum, however, was not the same across all firms.  Results from the cross-sectional analysis
indicate that firms that complied with the legislation fired approximately 2.5 more workers than
firms that evaded the legislation. Moreover, there is some evidence to suggest that large firms
increased employment after the rise of the minimum.  Perhaps most important, the time-series
analysis presents strong evidence that informal sector employment rose in response to Ghana’s
minimum wage policies.  If we assume that there was no simultaneous shift in the relative demand
for informal sector workers, this rise in the level of employment is likely to have caused a fall in
informal sector wages.  In other words, the analysis suggests that Ghana’s minimum wage policy
had the indirect effect of reducing the wages of those workers who could least afford it.  
Given the fact that workers in the informal sector are usually among the most vulnerable
workers in poor countries, it is important that studies which assess the impact of minimum wage
legislation take into account the effects on workers in both the “covered” and the “uncovered”
sectors.  From the preliminary evidence presented in this study, it appears that minimum wage
legislation can have a substantial impact on the level of informal sector employment in labor
markets where displaced workers cannot afford to be unemployed.  Thus, conventional models
which assume complete coverage may not capture the full impact which minimum wages have on
employment and wages.13
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Table 1:
Real Minimum Wages in Selected African Countries
Country 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
Algeria 56 69 100 . .
Benin . 143 100 91 .
Botswana . 85 100 113 88
Burkino Faso 79 87 100 87 101
Congo  . 157 100 96 .
Cote d’Ivoire 104 114 100 84 79
Gabon 90 107 100 90 84
Ghana 415 509 100 144 114
Kenya 119 121 100 68 53*
Malawi . 119 100 120 121*
Mauritius . . 100 104 110
Morocco . 98 100 118 132
Niger . 87 100 70 81
Senegal 99 111 100 78 78
Togo 143 131 100 80 80
Tunisia . 77 100 110 100
Zaire 805 599 100 164 .
Source: Squire and Suthiwart-Narueput (1995).   The original table has been amended by updating the 1990
figures.  The 1990 figures for Burkino Faso, Gabon, Kenya, Malawi, and Mauritius are obtained from various
ILO World Employment Reports.  The figures with a * refer to the year 1989.16
Table 2: 
Real Minimum and Manufacturing Wages in Ghana, 1970-1991 (1990 Prices)
Year
Min. Wage Wage Avg. Manuf
Public Sector Public Sector/
Wage Floor Avg. Manuf Min./ Avg. Manuf
1970 26223 10000 54101 0.48 0.18
1971 23863 10000 77364 0.31 0.13
1972 28320 13500 77364 0.37 0.17
1973 23863 16000 53560 0.45 0.30
1974 39334 18000 66003 0.60 0.27
1975 28583 18000 39333 0.73 0.46
1976 18880 13500 31250 0.60 0.43
1977 13374 11572 31857 0.42 0.36
1978 10489 10000 23538 0.45 0.42
1979 7080 7647 20941 0.34 0.37
1980 6556 6654 21231 0.31 0.31
1981 6818 8644 15311 0.45 0.56
1982 5379 6707 13568 0.40 0.49
1983 5242 5685 10581 0.50 0.54
1984 5141 6215 19441 0.26 0.32
1985 8545 10648 24573 0.35 0.43
1986 7723 11703 29000 0.27 0.40
1987 7411 13147 36143 0.21 0.36
1988 5552 13311 38098 0.15 0.35
1989 7861 11205 51031 0.15 0.22
1990 11960 9931 45045 0.27 0.22
1991 14913 10324 28451 0.52 0.36
Notes: All wages are monthly rates.  The wage data are obtained from several sources.  The minimum wage
data are derived from Jamal and Weeks (1987), Rimmer (1992) and Berry (1994).  Data from these sources
correspond to the following years: Jamal and Weeks (1970 to 1981), Rimmer (1982 to 1988) and Berry
(1989-1991).  All the public sector wages are reported in Teal (1997).  The average manufacturing wage
rates are reported in various editions of the Yearbook of Labour Statistics (ILO).17
Table 3: 
The Impact of the Minimum Wage on Average Wages and Total Employment, 1970-1991 
Dep. Variable: Ln Wages Ln Wages Ln (Emp/ Ln (Emp/
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pop) Pop)
constant 0.3863 0.9713 -0.4444 4.9363*
(0.6297) (1.0936) (0.2599) (0.0406)
Ln(Min) -0.0945 0.8143* — —
(0.2487) (0.2848)
Ln(Min/Manuf) — — -0.1180* -0.1723*
(0.0419) (0.0406)
Ln (Wages -1) 0.6342** 0.1374 — —
(0.2687) (0.2220)
Ln GDP 0.0178 0.1268 -0.0048 0.0030
(0.0178) (0.1031) (0.0227) (0.0152)
Ln GDP Deflator 0.2933 -0.2673 1.0508* 0.2711**
(0.3197) (0.3540) (0.0699) (0.1286)
Ln Cocoa  -0.2007 0.2735 0.1591** 0.1827*
(0.4812) (0.4105) (0.0730) (0.0456)
Ln Fertilizer -0.2661 -0.3716** 0.1089* 0.0896*
(0.1804) (0.1415) (0.0326) (0.0238)
Structural 0.4227 -0.1143 0.1429** 0.0906**
Adjust. (0.2826) (0.2697) (0.0635) (0.0374)
Dummy
Trend 0.1222 -0.0120 0.0120 0.0274*
(0.1025) (0.0876) (0.0089) (0.0064)
Durban Watson 2.2047 2.137 2.059 2.015
Adj. R- 0.9924 0.9934 0.9928 0.9769
squared
Notes: The minimum in columns 1 and 3 is the private sector wage floor; the minimum in columns 2 and 4 is
the public sector wage floor.  Columns 3 and 4 deflate the minimum wage by the average manufacturing wage.
Durban Watson tests are performed on all regressions.  The Prais-Winston (1954) estimator is used to correct
for possible serial autocorrelation in all columns except 4.  Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Statistical significance at the 1% level and 5% level is indicated by a * and **, respectively. 18
Table 4: 
The Impact of the Minimum Wage on Informal Sector and Female Employment, 1970-1991 
Dep. Variable: Ln(Inf/ Ln(Inf/ Ln(Fem/Emp) Ln(Fem/Emp)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Emp) Emp)
constant -0.0894 -1.1471 0.2613 0.0180
(1.2857) (0.7402) (0.0300) (0.0325)
Ln (Min/ 0.0483 0.1389** 0.0060 0.0053
Manuf) (0.0370) (0.0537) (0.0054) (0.0069)
Ln GDP -0.0468** -0.0270 0.0006 0.0005
(0.0218) (0.0204) (0.0027) (0.0027)
Ln GDP Deflator -0.0223 0.1104 -0.1158* -0.1135*
(0.2010) (0.1173) (0.0083) (0.0083)
Ln Cocoa  -0.3193* -2941* -0.0064 -0.0078*
(0.0680) (0.0561) (0.0093) (0.0094)
Ln Fertilizer 0.0070 -0.0355 -0.0075 -0.0077
(0.0285) (0.0307) (0.0043) (0.0049)
Structural -0.0586 -0.0608 -0.0085 -0.0076
Adjustment (0.057) (0.0470) (0.0083) (0.0084)
Dummy
Trend 0.0415* 0.0301* -0.0016 -0.0018
(0.0097) (0.0085) (0.0013) (0.0014)
Durban Watson 2.0784 1.9726 1.4460 1.4599
Adjusted  0.9465 0.9617 0.9913 0.9913
R-squared
Notes: The minimum in columns 1 and 3 is the private sector wage floor; the minimum in columns 2 and 4 is
the public sector wage floor.  All columns deflate the minimum wage by the average manufacturing wage.  The
dependent variable is defined as informal sector employment divided by total employment in columns 1 and
2.  Similarly, the dependent variable is defined as female employment divided by total employment in columns
3 and 4.  Durban Watson tests are performed on all regressions.  The Prais-Winston (1954) estimator is used
to correct for possible serial autocorrelation in columns 2 , 3, and 4.  Standard errors are reported in
parentheses.  Statistical significance at the 1% level and 5% level is indicated by a * and **, respectively. 19
Table 5:
Definitions and Descriptive Statistics of the Establishment Data
Variable Definition Mean Dev.
Std.
dE )Full-time Employment (excludes apprentices) 2.1043 21.3334
Minw Real minimum wage deflated by the unskilled
wage at firm I
Gap The proportionate increase in unskilled wages 0.9193 3.2397
at firm I needed to attain the minimum
Coverage Equals one if the unskilled wage at firm I 0.6261 0.4860
exceeds the minimum
Accra Equals one if the firm is located in the capital 0.6087 0.4902
city, Accra; zero otherwise
Kumasi Equals one of the firm is located in the capital 0.3043 0.4621
of the Ashanti region, Kumasi; zero otherwise
Food Equals one if the firm has a SIC classification 0.2870 0.4543
of 311; zero otherwise
Bevs Equals one if the firm has a SIC classification 0.0174 0.1312
of 312; zero otherwise
Garm Equals one if the firm has a SIC classification 0.1217 0.3284
of 322; zero otherwise
Wood Equals one if the firm has a SIC classification 0.0696 0.2553
of 331; zero otherwise 
Furn Equals one if the firm has a SIC classification 0.2714 0.4143
of 332; zero otherwise
Metal Equals one if the firm has a SIC classification 0.2348 0.4257
of 381; zero otherwise
Machinery Equals one if the firm has a SIC classification 0.0348 0.1840
of 382; zero otherwise
Union Equals one if the firm is unionized; zero 0.2957 0.4583
otherwise
KL Capital-labor ratio in 1990 prices 297.18 642.06
Informal Equals one if the firm uses on hand tools; zero 0.1652 0.3730
otherwise
Source: RPED Data. 20
Table 6:
Change in Employment at the Establishment Level
Indep. Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Minw -2.9896* — -3.0732* —
(0.6113) (0.7393)
Gap — -2.8093* — 0.2879*
(0.5603) (0.6754)
Controls for Region no no yes yes
Controls for no no yes yes
Industry
Controls for capital- no no yes yes
labor ratio
Includes informal no no yes yes
sector dummy
Adjusted  0.1674 0.1748 0.1219 0.1285
R-squared
Source: RPED Data.29